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Abstract
Background: Health IT can play a major role in improving patient safety. Computerized physician order entry with
decision support can alert providers to potential prescribing errors. However, too many alerts can result in providers
ignoring and overriding clinically important ones.
Objective: To evaluate the appropriateness of providers’ drug-drug interaction (DDI) alert overrides, the reasons why
they chose to override these alerts, and what actions they took as a consequence of the alert.
Design: A cross-sectional, observational study of DDI alerts generated over a three-year period between January
1st, 2009, and December 31st, 2011.
Setting: Primary care practices affiliated with two Harvard teaching hospitals. The DDI alerts were screened to
minimize the number of clinically unimportant warnings.
Participants: A total of 24,849 DDI alerts were generated in the study period, with 40% accepted. The top 62
providers with the highest override rate were identified and eight overrides randomly selected for each (a total of 496
alert overrides for 438 patients, 3.3% of the sample).
Results: Overall, 68.2% (338/496) of the DDI alert overrides were considered appropriate. Among inappropriate
overrides, the therapeutic combinations put patients at increased risk of several specific conditions including:
serotonin syndrome (21.5%, n=34), cardiotoxicity (16.5%, n=26), or sharp falls in blood pressure or significant
hypotension (28.5%, n=45). A small number of drugs and DDIs accounted for a disproportionate share of alert
overrides. Of the 121 appropriate alert overrides where the provider indicated they would “monitor as recommended”,
a detailed chart review revealed that only 35.5% (n=43) actually did. Providers sometimes reported that patients had
already taken interacting medications together (15.7%, n=78), despite no evidence to confirm this.
Conclusions and Relevance: We found that providers continue to override important and useful alerts that are likely
to cause serious patient injuries, even when relatively few false positive alerts are displayed.
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Introduction
Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) represents a
valuable tool that allows medication and laboratory orders to be
entered electronically by health care providers. While CPOE
can substantially reduce the number of prescription-writing
errors with even limited clinical decision support (CDS)[1], it is
the CDS that makes it such a powerful application for
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 December 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 12 | e85071
improving patient safety in both inpatient and ambulatory
settings; the impact will vary depending on the sophistication of
the CDS[2]. CDS systems are designed to assist physicians in
decision-making by providing them with real-time, relevant,
patient-specific information and guidance at various stages in
the health care process[3-6]. These systems can offer real
practical benefits and substantial cost savings by alerting
physicians to necessary drug-dosing adjustments, for example,
based on a patient’s renal function, and potential hazardous
drug-drug interactions (DDIs) and contraindications that need
to be addressed[7,8].
However, CDS is variably successful—and the success of
CDS systems often depend on both their intrinsic design and
the knowledge bases that sit behind them. The Institute of
Medicine has suggested that systems should be designed to
make it “hard for people to do the wrong thing and easy for
people to do the right thing”.[9] How closely the CDS advice
matches a provider’s intentions, and how much control the
provider has over assessing and responding to this, can
influence its overall potential to improve patient safety[10].
Physicians are often inundated with irrelevant and
inappropriate alerts, leading to high override rates. For
example, Weingart et al. found that physicians overrode 91.2%
of drug-allergy and 89.4% of high-severity drug interaction
alerts in one study, when the threshold for alerting was set too
low[11]. Too many alerts may result in ‘alert fatigue’, which can
result in physicians overlooking even important clinically
alerts[12]. Much of our recent work has focused on obtaining
the right balance between useful alerting and over-alerting; an
expert panel provided valuable guidance on those DDIs alerts
that should be non-interruptive, as well as those
contraindicated drug pairs for which physicians should always
be alerted[13,14]. Interruptive alerts usually require the
physician to provide a reason for their decision to override
which infers an intention to carry out a particular action like, for
example, will monitor drug levels as recommended. The
problem with overriding these alerts is that it is often unclear
whether, in fact, the provider has carried out this action or
simply ignored it. In addition, how human factors issues are
presented in the design of the alerts is also extremely
important[15-17].
In this study, we evaluated how often and more importantly
why providers overrode DDI alerts, in a setting in which
relatively few false positive alerts were being delivered, as the
knowledge base had already been “tuned” to address this
issue[10]. Specific outcomes were: (1) the appropriateness of
providers’ DDI alert overrides (2), the reasons why providers
chose to override these alerts, and (3) what actions they took
as a consequence of the alert.
Methods
Research Study site
This study included 36 primary care practices affiliated with
two Harvard teaching hospitals, Brigham and Women’s
Hospital and Massachusetts General Hospital (Boston, MA). A
total of 1718 prescribers serve these sites, which are part of a
regional integrated healthcare delivery system - Partners
HealthCare.
LMR and Clinical Decision Support
Partners HealthCare physicians working in the ambulatory
setting use a self-developed, Certification Commission for
Healthcare Information Technology (CCHIT)-approved,
electronic health record (EHR) - the Longitudinal Medical
Record (LMR). Implemented in 2000, the LMR allows providers
to document patient problems, medications, allergies, and
encounter notes; access laboratory and radiology reports; write
prescriptions and communicate with other healthcare providers.
The LMR has clinical decision support capability in the form of
medication alerts for drug-allergy and DDIs, and drug
suggestions in patients with renal failure, geriatrics, and those
on duplicate therapy. DDI alerts are generated at the time of
ordering, and use data from patients’ active medication list and
existing Partners DDI knowledge base. Partners DDI
knowledge base currently consists of approximately 5,000
active DDI rules, sourced from commercial knowledge bases
such as First DataBank, Inc., and reviewed and approved by
the Partners DDI Content Committee. This knowledge base
has been iteratively improved over time to reduce the number
of false positive alerts[10,13,14].
When a DDI alert is generated, a specific recommendation is
presented to the physician, which is linked to a monograph.
The recommendation includes the specific type of interaction
and often suggests a particular course of action (e.g., avoid
concurrent use of both drugs). Level 1 alerts indicate a very
serious, life-threatening interaction and require the provider to
discontinue the interacting medicine in order to proceed. Level
2 alerts suggest an undesirable interaction likely to cause
serious injury, and give the provider the option of ‘cancelling’
the order or ‘overriding’ the alert. Should the physician choose
to override the alert, they are required to select one of the
following coded reasons in order to proceed: “Will monitor as
recommended”, “Will adjust dose as recommended”, “Patient
has already tolerated combination”, “No reasonable
alternatives” or “Other” (Figure 1). If “Other” is selected, further
details should be entered in the free-text field. The provider will
also be given the opportunity to order follow-up lab tests at this
time, if indicated. Level 3 alerts specify the possibility of a less
serious, undesirable interaction and are presented as non-
interruptive alerts.
Study design and sample selection
This study was a cross-sectional, observational study of DDI
alerts generated over a three-year period between January 1st,
2009, and December 31st, 2011. Access to these data required
approval of the Partners Human Research Committee (PHRC),
which is the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Partners
Research Management at Partners HealthCare. On receiving
specific IRB approval for this study, all Level 2 DDI alerts that
were overridden were downloaded (total 14,966 overrides,
60.2% of alerts generated). Patients who did not give
permission for their information to be stored in the hospital
database and used for research were excluded. Our sample
was then limited to providers who had received 20 or more DDI
Examining Drug-Drug Interaction Alerts Overrides
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alerts (opportunity to override), and the number of times each
provider overrode these alerts calculated. The top 62 providers
with the highest override rate were identified and eight
overrides randomly selected for each provider (a total of 496
alert overrides for 438 patients, 3.3% of the sample). The
downloaded file included patients’ names and medical record
identification numbers; names of both medicines that triggered
the DDI alert; date of alert; practice location; prescribers’
names, identification numbers, sex, age, level and experience;
and the reasons given by providers at the time of overriding the
alert. Any duplicates were removed and replaced, and patient
information anonymized prior to analysis.
In the initial analysis, a physician and pharmacist expert
panel screened the sample for severe or contraindicated
interactions, based on the strength of the supporting clinical
evidence and the severity of the adverse events in different
knowledge bases, such as Partners Healthcare System
Medication Knowledge Base (PHS MKB); commercial
medication knowledge bases such as Micromedex (New York,
New York, USA); First DataBank (FDB) (San Francisco,
California, USA); and http://www.drugs.com. Alert overrides of
therapeutic duplications (e.g., sumatriptan and rizatriptan) and
therapeutic combinations that put the patient at an increased
risk of (i) serotonin syndrome (e.g., fluoxetine-sumatriptan), (ii)
seizures (e.g., tramadol-cyclobenzaprine), (iii) infection (e.g.,
hydroxyurea-zoster vaccine live), (iv) bone marrow suppression
(e.g., methotrexate-trimethoprim), (v) bleeding (e.g.,
dabigatran-ketoconazole), (vi) cardiotoxicity (e.g., QT
prolongation, torsades de pointes, cardiac arrest), (vii) opioid
withdraw symptoms (e.g., morphine-naltrexone), (viii) priapism
(e.g., tadalafil-clarithromycin), (ix) sharp falls in blood pressure
(e.g., sildenafil-nitroglycerin), or significant hypotension (e.g.,
sildenafil-tamsulosin), (x) reduced virologic response (e.g.,
tenofovir-atazanavir), and (xi) myopathy / rhabdomyolysis (e.g.,
diltiazem-high dose simvastatin) were all considered
inappropriate. Therapeutic combinations that may result in
decreased bioavailability and clinical effectiveness of one or
both drugs were also considered inappropriate. If the provider
indicated that there were “no reasonable alternatives”, “the
patient had already tolerated the combination”, or they had
“other” reason(s) for prescribing both drugs together, the record
was put forward for detailed chart review. If the provider gave
more than one reason, the carrying out of both actions was
assessed. Topically applied, ophthalmic and otic preparations
were considered appropriate. Alert overrides of DDIs involving
epinephrine autoinjector were also considered appropriate
when prescribed for severe allergic reactions.
Detailed chart review
The purpose of the review was to ascertain whether the
provider had carried out their intended action(s). Table 1 and 2
contain the criteria used for assessment of all appropriate alert
overrides. An academic pharmacist (S.P.S) reviewed the
electronic medical record for each of the 338 overrides from the
date the alert was triggered. An attending physician (K.C.N.)
independently reviewed a sample of these medical charts
(23.7%, n= 80) and inter-rater agreement calculated and found
to be excellent (κ=0.84). Any disagreements were resolved by
discussion with a third reviewer (D.W.B.).
Data Analysis
Data were downloaded directly into Microsoft Excel 2011
(Microsoft Corp, Redmond, WA). Descriptive statistics were
used to summarize the alert overrides considered appropriate,
the drugs and DDIs responsible for generating the majority of
alerts, the override reasons given by providers and the actions
they took. Comparisons involving categorical variables were
performed using Rao-Scott chi-square test statistics, adjusting
for clustering of providers. We used SAS statistical software,
version 9.3 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA) for all statistical
analyses.
Results
Summary
After the initial screening, 68.2% (338/496) of the DDI alert
overrides were considered appropriate. A detailed review of the
Figure 1.  Screenshot of a Level 2 alert.  
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0085071.g001
Examining Drug-Drug Interaction Alerts Overrides
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 December 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 12 | e85071
medical charts revealed that the desired action was only
carried out in 63.3% (214/338) of these cases. One hundred
and thirteen different drugs, and 119 different drug-drug
interactions, were found to have triggered the 496 DDI alerts.
Eight drugs in particular were responsible for generating
approximately three quarters of these alerts: simvastatin
(20.6%, n=102), sildenafil (9.9%, n=49), tramadol (9.5%, n=47),
citalopram (7.7%, n=38), amlodipine (7.5%, n=37), tamsulosin
(7.1%, n=35), azithromycin (6.5%, n=32), and warfarin (6.3%,
n=31).
Drug-drug and class-class interactions
Cumulatively, 44 of the different drug-drug interactions
accounted for over half (265/496) of the alerts shown to
providers, and could be categorized into ten class-class
interactions (Table 3). The calcium channel blockers – statins
(class-class) interaction was triggered most often (14.5%,
n=72), with amlodipine – simvastatin (drug-drug) interaction
accounting for over half (51.3%, n=37) of the alerts. The
phosphodiesterase type-5 inhibitors – alpha-adrenoceptor
Table 1. Criteria for assessment of intended actions.
Coded Reason for DDI
Alert Override Criteria
1. Will monitor as
recommended
Test ordered within the specified time period (see
Table 2)
2. Patient has already
tolerated combination
Five half-lives of the newly started or more recently
started medicine have elapsed
3. No reasonable
alternative
Evidence suggests that no other drug within the same
therapeutic class was a safer alternative, and/or
appropriate monitoring/dose adjustment was
conducted
4. Will adjust dose as
recommended
The dose was adjusted according to the alert
recommendations, or If no recommended dose was
specified, the appropriate monitoring was carried out
and any necessary dose adjustment made during the
course of treatment.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0085071.t001
Table 2. Time period within which the test should be
ordered after alert override.
 Time period
Creatine kinase 12 weeks
Cyclosporine 8 weeks
Digoxin 2 weeks
HbA1c 12 weeks
Lithium 12 weeks
Methotrexate 3 days
PT-INR (Prothrombin Time - International Normalized Ratio) 3 weeks
Respiratory status 4 weeks
Sirolimus 2 weeks
Tacrolimus 1 week
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0085071.t002
blocking drugs (class-class) interaction was second highest
(10.7%, n=53), with sildenafil – tamsulosin (drug-drug)
interaction making up less than half (47.2%, n=25) of the alerts
generated. The selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors – 5 HT1
receptor agonists (class-class) interaction and selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors – opioid analgesics (class-class)
interaction were third (7.3%, n=36) and fourth highest (3.4%,
n=17) respectively. In the latter group, the citalopram –
tramadol (drug-drug) interaction triggering over half of these
alerts (58.8%, n=10).
Table 3. Top 10 drug class-class interactions that were
overridden.
 Object Drug / Class* Precipitant Drug / Class†
Total no. (%)
of alert
overrides
1. Calcium channel blockers (i.e.,amlodipine; diltiazem; verapamil)
Statins (i.e., simvastatin;
lovastatin) 72 (14.5)
2.
Phosphodiesterase type-5
inhibitors (i.e., sildenafil; tadalafil;
vardenafil)
Alpha-adrenoceptor
blocking drugs (i.e.,
tamsulosin; terazosin;
doxazosin; alfuzosin)
53 (10.7)
3.
Antidepressants - selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (i.e.,
citalopram; sertraline; fluoxetine;
paroxetine; escitalopram;
fluvoxamine)
5 HT1 receptor agonists
- ‘Triptans’ (i.e.,
sumatriptan; eletriptan;
zolmitriptan; rizatriptan;
almotriptan)
36 (7.3)
4.
Antidepressants - selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (i.e.,
citalopram; sertraline)
Opioid Analgesics (i.e.,
tramadol) 17 (3.4)
5.
Antidepressants – tricyclic (i.e.,
amitriptyline; nortriptyline,
doxepin, imipramine)
Opioid Analgesics (i.e.,
tramadol) 16 (3.2)
6. Antibacterial drugs – macrolides(i.e., azithromycin; clarithromycin)
Statins (i.e., simvastatin;
atorvastatin) 16 (3.2)
7.
Central nervous system
stimulants (i.e., amphetamine /
dextroamphetamine)
Proton pump inhibitors
(i.e., omeprazole;
pantoprazole)
15 (3.0)
8.
Antibacterial drugs –
sulphonamides and trimethoprim
(i.e., trimethoprim/
sulfamethoxazole)
Oral anticoagulants –
coumarins (i.e., warfarin) 14 (2.8)
9. Lipid-regulating drugs – fibrates(i.e., gemfibrozil)
Statins (i.e., simvastatin;
rosuvastatin) 13 (2.6)
10. Sympathomimetics (e.g.,epinephrine autoinjector)
Beta-adrenoceptor
blocking drugs (i.e.,
propranolol; labetalol)
13 (2.6)
 Total 265 (53.4)
* The object drug was defined as the drug that has its therapeutic effect modified
by the interaction process.
† The precipitant drug was defined as the drug responsible for affecting the
pharmacologic action or the pharmacokinetic properties of the object drug.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0085071.t003
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Appropriateness of alert overrides
Over one third (158/496) of alert overrides were judged to be
inappropriate as the therapeutic combinations put patients at
increased risk of (i) serotonin syndrome (21.5%, n=34),
seizures (4.4%, n=7), or both (5.7%, n= 9); (ii) infection (2.5%,
n=4); (iii) bone marrow suppression (1.9%, n=3); (iv) bleeding
(0.6%, n=1), (v) cardiotoxicity (16.5%, n=26); (vi) opioid
withdraw symptoms (0.6%, n=1), (vii) priapism (8.2%, n=13),
(viii) sharp falls in blood pressure or significant hypotension
(28.5%, n=45); or (x) reduced virologic response (1.3%, n=2).
Therapeutic duplications (1.9%, n=3) and therapeutic
combinations (6.3%, n=10) that may result in decreased
bioavailability and clinical effectiveness of one or both drugs
were also considered inappropriate. Over half of the providers
(59.7%, n=37) were found to have inappropriately overridden
three or more alerts.
Reasons for alert overrides
The most common coded reasons for overriding DDI alerts
were ‘will monitor as recommended’ (43.9%, n=218), ‘will
adjust dose as recommended’ (16.9%, n=84), and ‘patient has
already tolerated combination’ (15.7%, n=78). Providers chose
the coded reason ‘other’ in 19.7% (n=98) of alert overrides,
providing a free-text explanation for why they chose to override
the alert in only 3.6% (n=18) of cases (Table 4). In 13 of these
18 cases, the provider commented that the drug had been
recommended by another healthcare provider (n=6), the patient
had already been counseled not to take both drugs together
(n=3), or the patient was no longer taking one of the drugs
listed as a potential cause of the interaction (n=4). In two more
cases, the provider wrote that they were tapering one of the
interacting drugs.
Carrying out the desired actions
The desired action was carried out in only 63.3% (214/338)
of cases. Of the 121 appropriate alert overrides where the
provider said they would “monitor as recommended”, a detailed
chart review revealed that only 35.5% (n=43) actually
completed the monitoring. Where the provider indicated that
they would “adjust dose as recommended”, 60% (n=21) of 35
appropriate alert overrides adjusted the dose according to the
Table 4. Coded reasons given by providers for overriding
DDI alerts.
Coded Reasons No. (%)*
Will monitor as recommended 218 (43.9)
Will adjust dose as recommended 84 (16.9)
Patient has already tolerated combination 78 (15.7)
No reasonable alternatives 2 (0.4)
Other (with no free text reason provided) 80 (16.1)
Other (with free text reason provided) 18 (3.6)
Combinations of the coded reasons listed above 16 (3.2)
Total 496
* Percentages have been rounded and may not total 100.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0085071.t004
alert recommendations; if no recommended dose was
specified, the appropriate monitoring was found to have been
carried out and any necessary dose adjustment made during
the course of treatment. Where the provider selected the coded
reason “patient has already tolerated combination”, five half-
lives of the newly started (or more recently started) medicine
had elapsed in 80.8% (n=63) of cases. Providers chose the
coded reason “other” (without providing a free-text explanation)
in 16.1% (n=80) of alert overrides; a potential reason was
found in the notes for 87.5% (n=70) of these cases, with
patients previously prescribed both drugs together in 58.8%
(n=47) of cases.
Providers’ attributes associated with alert overrides
We conducted a univariable analysis to see if factors such as
sex, age, and level and experience, were each associated with
the decision to 1) appropriately override the alert and 2) carry
out the intended action (Table 5). Providers’ level and
experience appeared to be the only factor associated with the
decision to carry out the intended action, with staff physicians
more experienced and less likely to carry out the intending
action than to carry them out (61.3% vs 31.1%; p<.001).
Discussion
Computer order entry linked with CDS holds great promise
for improving medication safety, quality, and efficiency.
However, many implementations have not achieved the
desired results, and DDIs have been an especially complex
domain. Few studies have looked at the appropriateness of
DDI alert overrides or whether providers actually carried out
their intended actions. In this study, providers appropriately
overrode just over two-thirds of the DDI alerts and carried out
the intended action in less than two-thirds of these cases.
We found that just eight drugs were responsible for
generating approximately three quarters of important DDI alerts
in this population. Drawing comparisons with existing literature,
Weingart et al.[11] found that certain drugs, one of which was
similar (e.g., azithromycin), accounted for approximately one
third of alerts. Taking a larger sample of drug interaction alerts,
we found different interactions generated over half of the alert
overrides. Some of these combinations should essentially
never be used as they put patients at increased risk of potential
lethal arrhythmia (torsades de pointes). Despite extensively
modifying our CDS system with fewer but more meaningful
interruptive alerts[10], our study shows that providers continue
to override important and useful alerts, which are likely to
cause serious patient injuries (Level 2). This raises broader
questions around whether we should be reaching out to
providers who are not prescribing optimally and working with
them to improve their prescribing.
To understand why users chose to override these alerts, this
study also captured the coded and free-text reasons they
provided. Similar to a previous study[10], the majority of
providers chose the coded reason “will monitor as
recommended”, with others selecting the coded reason “other”
and then leaving the free-text box blank. Failure to provide
free-text explanations for why alerts were overridden may
Examining Drug-Drug Interaction Alerts Overrides
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conceal good clinical reasoning. A key difference between our
study and the Shah et al. study [10] is that we also reviewed
the charts to see whether the provider actually took action
(e.g., monitored the required levels or adjusted the dose) as a
consequence of the alert. Our study showed how the intended
action was carried out in only two-thirds of cases. This is an
important finding as it raises concerns over patient safety.
Failure to monitor a patient’s drug levels (e.g., digoxin) after
initiation of an interacting drug (e.g., verapamil) can result in
potentially serious side effects for the patient[18]. Our study
also revealed how some providers selected the coded reason
“patient has already tolerated combination”, yet no information
was found to suggest that the patient had been taking both
drugs together previously. Although difficult to say for certain, it
is possible that some providers may have randomly chosen this
(or indeed potentially any) coded reason in order to proceed
with the order. More research is needed to explore the human
factors elements that influence provider behaviour, including
non-clinical motivations of providers, such as patient demands,
workload, time constraints in a busy office practice, attitudes
towards particular diseases or patients, habits, and peer
influence.
Like any research study, this study had inherent limitations. It
was undertaken within a single healthcare delivery system
using one outpatient prescribing system and, as such, is
difficult to assess how generalizable the results are to other
prescribing systems. It was also possible for patients to have
been receiving care from providers outside the integrated
Partners HealthCare system. In some cases, this may not have
been documented in the patients’ records. Notwithstanding
these limitations, the findings have important implications for
the future design of clinical decision support alerts.
Conclusion
An important aspect of CDS is screening of severe DDIs and
prompting providers to take action to prevent concomitant use.
We found that, despite extensively modifying our CDS system
to improve user acceptance and show only the most important
alerts, providers continued to override these alerts that are
likely to cause serious patient injuries. More needs to be done
to effectively feedback to providers with high inappropriate
override rates and improve prescribing safety in the primary
care setting.
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Table 5. Providers’ attributes associated with alert overrides.
 Stage 1: Initial screening Stage 2: Chart review
 No. (%) of alert overrides*  No. (%) of alert overrides*  
Provider attributes Appropriate (n=338) Inappropriate (n=158) Total (n=496) P Value Actioned (n = 214) Not actioned (n = 124) Total (n=338) P Value
Sex    0.0022    0.1837
Male (n=25) 112(33.1) 88(55.7) 200(40.3)  63(29.4) 49(39.5) 112(33.1)  
Female (n=37) 226(66.9) 70(44.3) 296(59.7)  151(70.6) 75(60.5) 226(66.9)  
Age, y    0.6151    0.1786
< 35 (n=14) 77(22.8) 35(22.2) 112(22.6)  46(21.5) 31(25.0) 77(22.8)  
35 - 65 (n=45) 249(73.7) 111(70.3) 360(72.6)  163(76.2) 86(69.4) 249(73.7)  
> 65 (n=3) 12(3.6) 12(7.6) 24(4.8)  5(2.3) 7(5.7) 12(3.6)  
Level & experience    0.1019    <.0001
Staff physician (n=31) 143(42.3) 105(66.4) 248(50.0)  67(31.3) 76(61.3) 143(42.3)  
House officer/fellow (n=4) 25(7.8) 7(4.4) 32(6.5)  16(7.5) 9(7.3) 25(7.4)  
Nurse (n=9) 59(17.5) 13(8.2) 72(14.5)  49(22.9) 10(8.1) 59(17.5)  
Medical assistants (n=5) 34(10.1) 6(3.8) 40(8.1)  33(15.4) 1(0.8) 34(10.1)  
Resident (n=7) 39(11.5) 17(10.8) 56(11.3)  21(9.8) 18(14.5) 39(11.5)  
Unknown/Undisclosed (n=6) 38(11.3) 10(6.3) 48(9.7)  28(13.1) 10(8.1) 38(11.2)  
* Percentages have been rounded and may not total 100.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0085071.t005
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